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Close Corporation Stock as a "Security" Under Uniform
Commercial Code Article 8: North Carolina Embraces the
Statute of Frauds in Stancil v. Stancil
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code attempts to ensure full negotia-
bility for all types of investment securities.' The statutory definition of the term
"security" identifies the instruments to which Article 8 applies.2 One require-
ment of the definition is that the instrument be "[o]f a type commonly dealt in
on securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized in any area in
which it is issued or dealt... as a medium for investment."' 3 Because the special
characteristics of closely held companies make their shares ill-suited to securities
exchange trading,4 state and federal courts have questioned whether close stock
falls within the Uniform Commercial Code's definition of "security." In Stancil
v. Stancils the North Carolina Supreme Court held that Article 8's definition of
a "security" includes the stock of close corporations. 6 By applying the Code
definition of a "security" to close stock, the supreme court rendered oral agree-
ments for the sale of shares in close corporations subject to the strictures of
Article 8's statute of frauds.7
This Note analyzes the supreme court's decision to include close corpora-
tion stock within the Code's definition of a security. The Note surveys the treat-
ment of closely held shares under Article 8 by state and lower federal courts
throughout the country. It also examines two decisions in which the United
1. U.C.C. § 8-101 official comment (1977); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8 N.C. comment (1986)
("Article 8's premise is that all types of investment securities, whether bonds or stocks, are suffi-
ciently similar that they can all be governed by the same uniform statute."); Folk, Some Problems
Under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 ARIz. L. REv. 193, 193 (1964) (discussing
Article 8's unitary treatment of all forms of securities). Article 8 does not address those aspects of
investment securities governed by corporation laws, "blue sky" laws, or federal securities statutes.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8 N.C. comment (1986); id. § 25-8-101 official comment (1986 & Supp.
1990).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-102 official comment (1986). The definition reads:
A "security" is an instrument which
(i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and
(ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly
recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment; and
(iii) s either one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class or series of
instruments; and
(iv) evidences a share, participation or other interest in property or in an enterprise or
evidences an obligation of the issuer.
Id. § 25-8-102(1)(a). The North Carolina General Assembly adopted the 1977 amendments to § 25-
8-102(a)(ii) in 1989. For the full text of the amended definition, see infra note 44.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-102(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1990).
4. "[No satisfactory all-purpose definition of a close corporation appears ever to have been
worked out .. " Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 491 (1948).
One oft-quoted definition states that a close corporation is one "in which the stock is held in a few
hands, or in a few families, and wherein it is not at all, or only rarely, dealt in by buying and selling."
Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1964) (citing Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F.2d
270, 273 (8th Cir. 1935)).
5. 326 N.C. 766, 392 S.E.2d 373 (1990).
6. Id. at 770, 392 S.E.2d at 376.
7. Id.
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States Supreme Court held that the stock of close corporations constitutes a
"security" for purposes of the federal securities laws.8 The Note concludes that
in Stancil the North Carolina Supreme Court properly insisted that a modicum
of certainty and reliability mark informal agreements between close corporation
participants. It further concludes that another important policy consideration-
the protection of individual investors-supports the court's decision to define
closely held shares as "securities" under both negotiable instruments laws and
securities "police" statutes.
Bruce Stancil incorporated Bruce Stancil Refrigeration, Inc. under North
Carolina law in 1973. 9 Seven years later Howard Stancil, Bruce's brother, be-
came employed with Bruce Stancil Refrigeration as office manager and book-
keeper.10 Shortly after Howard joined the company, Bruce and Howard
engaged in a series of discussions and negotiations that culminated in Howard's
purchase of fifty percent of the outstanding stock of Bruce Stancil Refrigera-
tion.11 The brothers' working relationship eventually deteriorated, 12 and How-
ard left the company in 1984.13
Two years later Bruce filed suit against Howard, 14 claiming that during
their negotiations Howard orally had agreed to sell his stock back to Bruce if
Howard became unable to perform his business duties, left the company, or
could not work amicably with Bruce. 15 Bruce sought specific performance of
the agreement. 16 Howard responded that Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial
Code makes oral contracts for the sale of investment securities unenforceable
and moved for summary judgment. 17 The trial court granted Howard's motion,
and Bruce appealed.' 8
8. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985), discussed infra notes 128-35
and accompanying text; Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985), discussed infia notes 136-38 and
accompanying text.
9. Stancil, 326 N.C. at 767, 392 S.E.2d at 374.
10. Plaintiff-Appellee's New Brief at 4, Stancil (No. 299PA89).
11. Stancil, 326 N.C. at 767, 392 S.E.2d at 374. Although Bruce Stancil ran the company as a
one-man operation, he did not own the fifty percent equity interest that he ultimately transferred to
Howard until shortly before the brothers concluded their deal. See Defendant-Appellant's New
Brief at 2, Stancil (No. 299PA89).
12. Other litigation resulted from the collapse of the brothers' business relationship. In Stancil
v. Bruce Stancil Refrigeration, Inc., 81 N.C. App. 567, 344 S.E.2d 789, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 418,
349 S.E.2d 601 (1986), Howard brought suit against Bruce over the conduct of a shareholders'
election of directors. Id. at 568, 344 S.E.2d at 790. As in Stancil v. Stancil, Howard and Bruce
owned the stock in the corporation equally. With both brothers voting their shares cumulatively,
Howard cleverly cast his votes for only two of his three nominees (himself and his wife), thus assur-
ing those candidates control of the three-member board. Id. at 570, 344 S.E.2d at 791. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling that the election was valid. Id. at 577, 344
S.E.2d at 795. Cf. R. ROBINSON, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW § 7.4, at
116 n.20 (1990) (stating that Stancil v. Bruce Stancil Refrigeration, Inc. offers "a good example of
how careful strategy in cumulative voting can reward the diligent").
13. Stancil, 326 N.C. at 767, 392 S.E.2d at 374.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 766, 392 S.E.2d at 374.
17. Id. at 767, 392 S.E.2d at 374. Howard also denied that an agreement to resell the stock to
Bruce ever existed. See Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 2-3, Stancil (No. 299PA89).
18. Stancil, 326 N.C. at 767, 392 S.E.2d at 374.
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for
trial on the merits.19 The court reasoned that the stock of a closely held corpo-
ration does not constitute a "security" and therefore is not subject to the require-
ments of the Uniform Commercial Code's statute of frauds.20 Relying on the
Official Comment to Article 8's definition of a "security," the court of appeals
explained that organized stock exchanges and over-the-counter markets would
be unlikely to consider closely held shares suitable for trading.2 1 The court of
appeals followed the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Penley v. Pen-
ley,22 in which a preincorporation oral agreement between husband and wife to
share in the ownership of a close corporation was held to be enforceable as a
matter of simple contract law.23 Recalling the supreme court's well-known dis-
cussion of the differences between publicly held corporations and close corpora-
tions in Meiselman v. Meiselman,24 the court of appeals decided that the
19. Stancil v. Stancil, 94 N.C. App. 319, 323, 380 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1989), rev'd, 326 N.C. 766,
392 S.E.2d 373 (1990).
20. Because Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which contains its own statute of
frauds, governs the negotiability of investment securities, an instrument must satisfy Article 8's defi-
nition of "security" before other Article 8 provisions can control its sale or transfer. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-8 N.C. comment (1986) ('The coverage of [A]rticle 8 rests upon the broad definition of
the term 'security' .... ); id. § 25-8-102 official comment (1986) (purpose of § 25-8-102 is to "define
the basic term of this Article, 'security,' and so to identify the instruments to which this Article
applies").
The text of Article 8's statute of frauds reads:
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless
(a) There is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or
by his authorized agent or broker sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made for
sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price;
(b) Delivery of a certificated security or transfer instruction has been accepted, or
transfer of an uncertificated security has been registered and the transferee has failed to
send written objection to the issuer within 10 days after receipt of the initial transaction
statement confirming the registration, or payment has been made but the contract is en-
forceable under this provision only to the extent of such delivery or payment;
(c) Within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the sale or purchase and
sufficient against the sender under paragraph (a) has been received by the party against
whom enforcement is sought and he has failed to send written objection to its contents
within ten days after its receipt; or
(d) The party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony
or otherwise in court that a contract was made for sale of a stated quantity of described
securities at a defined or stated price.
Id. § 25-8-319 (Supp. 1990).
21. Stancil, 94 N.C. App. at 323, 380 S.E.2d at 426-27 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-
102(1)(a)(ii) official comment (1986)).
22. 314 N.C. 1, 332 S.E.2d 51 (1985). In Penley, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had
asked him to work at her restaurant after she became ill. Id. at 5, 332 S.E.2d at 54. He alleged that
the defendant had promised that if he would devote his full time to the business, the parties would
operate it jointly, sharing equally in the assets and profits. Id.
23. Id. at 19, 332 S.E.2d at 62. The Penley court rejected as "narrow and inflexible" the argu-
ment that the North Carolina Business Corporation Act requires shareholders' agreements to be in
writing. Id. at 23, 332 S.E.2d at 64. In deciding Stancil, the court of appeals also relied on its own
decision in Loy v. Lorm Corp., 52 N.C. App. 428, 441, 278 S.E.2d 897, 906 (1981), in which it had
held an oral preincorporation agreement enforceable despite the absence of a writing. Stancil, 94
N.C. App. at 322, 380 S.E.2d at 426.
24. 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983). In Meiselman, the supreme court recognized that
"'[c]lose corporations are often little more than incorporated partnerships.'" Id. at 288, 307 S.E.2d
at 557 (quoting Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Ground for Corporate Dissolution, 1965 DUKE
L.J. 128, 138). The court also stated that close corporations are frequently "based on personal
1434 [Vol. 69
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"dynamics of the close corporation ' 25 demand liberal treatment of oral
agreements. 26
Howard Stancil appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, 27 contend-
ing that the court of appeals had erred in refusing to bring the parties' oral
agreement within Uniform Commercial Code Article 8's statute of frauds.28
The defendant argued that the court of appeals had made the close corporation a
"creature of statutory exception"2 9 despite the Code drafters' intent to accom-
modate both publicly held and close corporations under a single statutory um-
brella.30 The informality of oral agreements between close corporation
participants, he claimed, could "only be extended so far before the floodgates of
fraud are opened and virtually limitless litigation ensues."'3 1
The North Carolina Supreme Court accepted Howard's argument and re-
versed the decision of the court of appeals, rejecting that court's reliance on
corporate law doctrine32 as a proper basis for excluding closely held stock from
the Uniform Commercial Code's definition of "security. ' 33 Justice Mitchell,
writing for a unanimous court, stated that such considerations were "inappo-
site"34 to the central issue in the case:
[l]t is inconsequential whether the shares of stock in question are in
fact suitable for trading or have ever been traded on an exchange or
market. The statutory definition only requires ... that instruments be
"of a type" that is dealt in on securities exchanges or markets in order
to be deemed investment securities. Since stock exchanges and mar-
kets generally facilitate the trading of shares of corporate stock... the
shares of a corporation-whether publicly or closely held-are instru-
ments "of a type" commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or
relationships that give rise to certain 'reasonable expectations' on the part of those acquiring an
interest in the close corporation." Id. at 289, 307 S.E.2d at 558. For more detailed analyses of the
Meiselman decision, see Note, Minority Shareholders' Rights in the Close Corporation Under the New
North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 68 N.C.L. Rv. 1109, 1111, 1112-15 (1990); Note, A New
Approach to Fulfilling Shareholders' Expectations in Close Corporations: Meiselman v. Meiselman,
20 WAKE FoRST L. REV. 505 (1984).
25. Stancil, 94 N.C. App. at 323, 380 S.E.2d at 426.
26. Id. at 322-23, 380 S.E.2d at 426.
27. See Petition for Discretionary Review at 6, Staned (No. 299PA89).
28. Id. at 4-5; cf. Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 15-16, Stancil (No. 299PA89) (court of
appeals bound by precedent of Oakley v. Little, 49 N.C. App. 650, 272 S.E.2d 370 (1980), discussed
infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text).
29. Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 15, Stancil (No. 299PA89).
30. Petition for Discretionary Review at 4-5, Stancil (No. 299PA89); cf. Defendant-Appellant's
New Brief at 13, 15-16, Stancil (No. 299PA89) (arguing that removing the stock of closely held
corporations from within the U.C.C.'s definition of "security" encourages "predatory practices" by
shareholders).
31. Petition for Discretionary Review at 6, Stancil (No. 299PA89).
32. Stancil, 326 N.C. at 767-68, 771, 392 S.E.2d at 375, 376-77. The supreme court stated that
Penley v. Penley, 314 N.C. 1, 332 S.E.2d 51 (1985), and Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307
S.E.2d 551 (1983), the principal decisions on which the court of appeals had relied, involved ques-
tions arising under the North Carolina Business Corporation Act that were not pertinent to the
Uniform Commercial Code issue in Stancil. Stancil, 326 N.C. at 767-68, 771, 392 S.E.2d at 375,
376-77.
33. Stancil, 326 N.C. at 768, 392 S.E.2d at 375.
34. Id.
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markets. 35
Dismissing contrary decisions by the highest courts of three other states,36
the North Carolina Supreme Court joined a growing majority of state courts
that place closely held stock within the strictures of Article 8.37 The court held
that because the stock of Bruce Stanc Refrigeration constituted a "security,"
the statute of frauds provision in Article 8 rendered any oral agreement for its
sale unenforceable.38
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code promulgated the model stat-
ute in 1962. 39 Over the following decade unprecedented increases in the volume
of commercial paper involved in exchange and over-the-counter trading, in addi-
tion to the rapidly expanding use of "paperless securities," made actual delivery
of certificates of ownership cumbersome.4' At the urging of securities dealers
and exchanges, in 1977 the Uniform Laws Commissioners approved a number of
revisions to Article 8.41 The original Code definition of "security" 42 became the
bifurcated statute of today, with separate subsections for "certificated" and "un-
certificated" securities.43 Despite the division, however, the basic verbal
formula remained the same for both terms.44
35. Id. Justice Mitchell noted that, although not controlling, the comments to the amended
version of § 25-8-102 include the stock of close corporations within the definition of "security." Id.
at 770, 392 S.E.2d at 376; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-102 amended official comment (Supp. 1990).
36. Stancil, 326 N.C. at 769, 392 S.E.2d at 375-76 (citing Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435,
441 (Me. 1978), discussed infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text; Rhode Island Hosp. v. Collins,
117 R.L 535, 538, 368 A.2d 1225, 1227 (1977); and Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654
S.W.2d 659, 664 (renn. 1983), discussed infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text).
37. See cases cited infra note 58.
38. Stancil, 326 N.C. at 770-71, 392 S.E.2d at 376-77.
39. E. GuTmANN, MODERN SECURrrIEs TRANSFERS 1 1.04, at 1-15 (3d ed. 1987). For a gen-
eral history of the Uniform Commercial Code, see Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 798 (1958).
40. 7 W. HAWKLAND, R. ALDERMAN & W. SCHNEIDER, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SE-
RIES, § 8-101:03, at 6. "Paperless securities" are traded solely on the books of specialists on the
exchange floor; delivery of the actual instruments seldom occurs. Id.
41. Id. § 8-101:03, at 6-7; see also R. ROBINSON, supra note 12, § 10.9, at 190-93 & nn.23-24
(citing articles that debated the proposed revisions).
42. For the full text of the original definition, see supra note 2.
43. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-102(1)(a), (b) (Supp. 1990).
44. Id. The definitions read:
(a) A "certificated security" is a share, participation, or other interest in property of or
an enterprise of the issuer or an obligation of the issuer which is:
(i) Represented by an instrument issued in bearer or registered form,
(ii) Of a type commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or markets or com-
monly recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for
investment, and
(ii) Either one of a class or series or by its terms divisible into a class or
series of shares, participations, interests, or obligations.
(b) An "uncertificated security" means a share, participation, or other interest in
property or an enterprise of the issuer or an obligation of the issuer which is:
(i) Not represented by an instrument and the transfer of which is registered
upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the issuer,
(ii) Of a type commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or markets,
(ii) Either one of a class or series or by its terms divisible into a class or
series of shares, participations, interest, or obligations, and
(iv) Not a partnership interest in a limited partnership, unless the partner-
ship is approved for trading on a national securities exchange registered under the
[Vol. 691436
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The North Carolina General Assembly adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code in 1965.45 The legislature did not, however, add the 1977 amendments to
Article 8 until 1989,46 when it promulgated the new Business Corporation
Act.47 The definitions of "certificated" and "uncertificated" securities in the
North Carolina version48 differ somewhat from the 1977 uniform revision, prin-
cipaly by the addition of subsection (1)(b)(iv). This subdivision removes from
the definition of "uncertificated security" limited partnership interests not
traded on a national securities exchange or quoted on an automated quotation
system such as the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quo-
tation System (NASDAQ).49
During the period between North Carolina's adoption of the Code and the
supreme court's decision in Stancil, North Carolina courts addressed the appli-
cability of Article 8 to close corporations only indirectly. In Oakley v. Little50
the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a memorandum prepared by the
plaintiff during negotiations over the purchase of stock in a close corporation
failed to satisfy the writing requirement of Article 8's statute of frauds.5 ' The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who owned one-half of the company's stock,
federal securities laws or for quotation in the automated quotation system of a
national securities association registered under the federal securities laws.
Id.; see also id. amended official comment ("These definitions are functional rather than formal. At
the core is the notion that a security is a share or participation in an enterprise or an obligation that
is of a type commonly traded in organized markets for such interests or is commonly recognized as a
medium for investment.").
The primary difference between the old and new definitions is the absence of the phrase "or
commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment" in the
definition of an "uncertificated security." The Commissioners omitted this language because they
feared that interests not commonly traded, such as bank checking and savings accounts, would be
thought to fall within the "uncertificated" portion of the definition. Id. A secondary difference is
the requirement that "uncertificated securities" be registered upon books "maintained for that pur-
pose"; since no paper exists to represent an uncertificated interest, the interest cannot be "issued in
bearer or registered form." Id. § 25-8-102(1)(a)(i), (b)(i).
45. Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 700, § 1, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 768, 768-919 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8 (1986 & Supp. 1990)). In North Carolina, Article 8 replaced the parts of
the 1899 Negotiable Instruments Law that governed bonds and debentures and the 1941 Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, re-enacted in 1955 as part of the Business Corporation Act. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-8-101 N.C. comment (1986). See generally Folk, Article Eight: Investment Securities, 44
N.C.L. Rxv. 654, 656-57 (1966) (comparing Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Negotiable Instruments Law). All 50 states have adopted Article 8; 33 employ the 1977 version and
17 use the 1962 version. Note, Stock in A Closely Held Corporation: Is It a Security for Uniform
Commercial Code Purposes?, 42 VAND. L. Rv. 579, 580 n.10 (1989).
46. See Act of July 6, 1989, ch. 588, § 1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 1515, 1515-58 (codified in
scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8 (Supp. 1990)).
47. See Act of June 8, 1989, ch. 265, § 1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566, 566-679 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55 (1990)); R. ROBINSON, supra note 12, § 10.9, at 193 & n.24.
48. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-102(l)(a), (b) (Supp. 1990).
49. Id. § 25-8-102(1)(b)(iv). The legislature considered the change desirable "in order to avoid
imposing on North Carolina partnerships obligations ... which are not otherwise required by the
North Carolina Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. For limited partnership interests which
are not traded on an active market, the requirements of North Carolina partnership law were consid-
ered sufficient." Id. N.C. comment.
50. 49 N.C. App. 650, 272 S.E.2d 370 (1980).
51. Id. at 654-55, 272 S.E.2d at 373-74. For the full text of Article 8's statute of frauds, see
supra note 20. When the North Carolina General Assembly adopted the 1977 amendments to the
Uniform Commercial Code, it inserted several minor emendations to bring the statute of frauds
provision into conformity with the amendments to the definition of "security" in § 8-102. N.C.
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had agreed to buy the remainder of the stock from its owner and resell it to the
plaintiff.52 The court of appeals reasoned that the memorandum was only a
"working tool"5 3 that the defendant had not signed; consequently, the document
failed to satisfy the statute of frauds.5 4 The court of appeals never addressed the
question whether the shares at issue were "investment securities" within the
meaning of Article 8;-5 it simply assumed that Article 8 applied to the
transaction.56
Since the promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code,5 7 at least
twenty-one state and federal courts have examined the scope of Article 8's defi-
nition of an "investment security." The majority view, endorsed by sixteen ju-
risdictions5" in addition to North Carolina,59 is that close stock falls within the
definition; a minority of four courts 6° holds that it does not. The outcome of the
debate rests upon a simple question: whether the phrase "of a type commonly
dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets" expresses a legal, as opposed to a
factual, characteristic of investment securities.
Equitable considerations within the close corporation have led a few courts
to construe the definition of a "security" in Article 8 as excluding close stock. 61
Difficulties typically occur when management, fraudulently or in good faith, en-
GEN. STAT. § 25-8-102 amended official comment (Supp. 1990). For a review of the changes, see
supra notes 41-43.
52. Oakley, 49 N.C. App. at 651, 272 S.E.2d at 371.
53. Id. at 654, 272 S.E.2d at 373.
54. Id. at 653, 272 S.E.2d at 372.
55. In Standil v. Stanil, 94 N.C. App. 319, 380 S.E.2d 424 (1989), rev'd, 326 N.C. 766, 392
S.E.2d 373 (1990), the North Carolina Court of Appeals specifically declined to follow Oakley. Id.
at 321, 380 S.E.2d at 426. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court did not mention Oakley
when it reversed the decision of the court of appeals, its holding apparently affirms Oakley's result.
56. Oakley, 49 N.C. App. at 652, 272 S.E.2d at 372 ("The sale of investment securities is gov-
erned by Article Eight of the Uniform Commercial Code. G.S. 25-8-319 is the statute of frauds
applicable to such transactions in North Carolina."). In dictum the court further observed that
because "[t]here are few cases construing the statute of frauds applicable to the sale of investment
securities ... [p]rior decisions involving the construction of the [U.C.C.] statute of frauds applicable
to the sale of goods ... are instructive in determining the correct application of G.S. 25-8-319." Id.
at 653, 272 S.E.2d at 372.
57. For a discussion of the history of the Code, see supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
58. See Lynch v. Janson, No. 90-5063 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 1990) (mem.) (WESTLAW, Allstates
library); In re Domestic Fuel Corp., 70 Bankr. 455, 462 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Sandefer, 47
Bankr. 133, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985); Katz v. Abrams, 549 F. Supp. 668, 671 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(mem.); In re Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956, 960-61 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981); Baker v. Gotz, 387 F. Supp.
1381, 1390 (D. Del.), aff'd metr, 523 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1975); United Indep. Ins. Agencies v.
Bank of Honolulu, 6 Haw. App. 222, 228-29, 718 P.2d 1097, 1102 (1986); Smith v. Baker, 715
S.W.2d 890, 892 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Gross v. Vogel, 81 A.D.2d 576, 577, 437 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (mem.); Pantel v. Becker, 89 Misc. 2d 239, 241-42, 391 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Previti v. Rubenstein, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 882, 883-84 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1966); Fox v. Overton, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 483, 484 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974); Jenni-
son v. Jennison, 346 Pa. Super. 47, 52-53, 499 A.2d 302, 304 (1985); Kenney v. Porter, 604 S.W.2d
297, 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Associates Fin. Servs. v. Sevy, 776 P.2d 650, 652 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Wamser v. Bamberger, 101 Wis. 2d 637, 646, 305 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Ct. App. 1981).
59. Stancil, 326 N.C. at 768, 392 S.E.2d at 375.
60. Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435, 441 (Me. 1978); Gulf Mortgage & Realty Invs. v. Allen,
282 Pa. Super. 230, 234, 422 A.2d 1090, 1092 (1980); Rhode Island Hosp. v. Collins, 117 R.I. 535,
538, 368 A.2d 1225, 1227 (1977); Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659, 664
(Tern. 1983).
61. See cases cited supra note 60.
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tices a prospective employee to join the company with the promise of selling her
an equity interest. 62 In Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc.,63 for example,
the owner of a majority of the shares in a closely held asphalt and concrete
business orally agreed to sell the plaintiff twenty-five percent of the company's
stock as an inducement for him to accept employment." After sb: years of work
and several unsuccessful attempts to secure the promised shares, the plaintiff left
the company and sued to enforce the oral agreement. 65 Affirming the trial
court's decision for the plaintiff, the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the de-
fendant the protection of Article 8's statute of frauds.66 The court held that the
corporation's stock did not fall within the definition of "security" in Article 8,67
reasoning that because no "market" existed for American Materials stock, it
could not constitute an instrument "of a type commonly dealt in upon securities
exchanges or markets." 68
A second common scenario involves a shareholders' agreement to buy, sell,
or offer the whole interest owned by a single stockholder to the other investors
or to the corporation itself when certain events occur.69 In the illustrative case
of Zamore v. Whitten,70 a husband and wife brought suit against the majority
shareholder of a family-owned business71 to recover damages for defendant's
alleged breach of an oral contract to purchase their shares for a stipulated
62. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975); 1
F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02, at 3-4 (3d ed. 1986) (share-
holders often perform the daily management duties of closely held concerns). The Donahue court
listed three characteristics that close corporations frequently possess: "(1) a small number of stock-
holders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock, and (3) substantial majority stockholder partici-
pation in the management direction and operations of the corporation." Donahue, 367 Mass. at 586,
328 N.E.2d at 511 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the definition of a close corporation, see
supra note 4.
63. 654 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1983).
64. Id. at 660.
65. Id. at 660-61; see also Note, supra note 45, at 582 (observing that because the equities in the
case clearly lay with the plaintiff, the result "represents a classic example of the old adage 'hard cases
make bad law"' (quoting Northern See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting))).
66. Blasingame, 654 S.W.2d at 668.
67. Id. at 664. Observing that only one sale of shares had occurred in the corporation's exist-
ence, the court concluded that "the history of defendant corporation's stock... rendered it impossi-
ble for defendant to show that its stock was dealt in by securities exchanges or was commonly
recognized as a medium for investment." Id. The Blasingame court relied in part on a Texas case in
which the appellate court held that "whether the stock of a corporation was dealt in upon securities
exchanges or commonly recognized as a medium for investment, or otherwise came within the defini-
tion of a security" was a question of fact. Id. (citing Kenney v. Porter, 557 S.W.2d 589, 591-92 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977) (emphasis added). On appeal after trial on the merits, the appellate court in Kenney
withdrew its earlier description of the definition as a "question of fact" and decided as a matter of
law that close corporation shares are "securities" for purposes of U.C.C. § 8-102(l)(a)(ii). Kenney
v. Porter, 604 S.W.2d 297, 301-02 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
68. Blasingame, 654 S.W.2d at 664. The court considered the lack of an established value for
the company's stock persuasive: "The proof adduced on the value of the stock makes it clear that
there was no market available for this stock." Id.
69. The litigation in Stancil resulted from just such an agreement. See supra notes 14-18 and
accompanying text.
70. 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978).
71. Plaintiffs owned 75 shares, a one-third interest in the company's capital stock, defendant,
who was the brother of one of the plaintiffs, owned 150 shares, a two-thirds interest. Id. at 438.
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amount.72 Despite the defendant's repeated assurances that the transaction
soon would take place,73 nearly a year passed fruitlessly.7 4 The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
ground that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that an enforceable contract
existed as a matter of law.7" The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed.
76
Although the court expressly noted that one of the "underlying purposes" of the
Code is "'to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions,' ,,77 it created an exception to these broad concerns in Zamore by
concluding that the stock of close corporations does not fall within the Code's
definition of a "security." 7 8  Like the Tennessee Supreme Court in Blasin-
game,79 the Maine court in Zamore decided that the Article 8 definition of a
"security" demands what does not exist-an actual "market" for close stock.80
Indeed, the Zamore court called for something that never could exist, because a
close corporation is, by definition, a corporation with few shareholders whose
stock is not widely traded.
In support of its decision to refuse close corporation shares status as "secur-
ities," one court has observed that the motive for investing in a closely held
company often differs from the impetus for buying publicly traded stock. 8
72. Id. One of the plaintiffs had been employed as general manager of the company before
defendant fired him. The defendant later sent the plaintiffs a letter offering to buy their shares if
money became available. Id.
73. Id. at 438-39. Throughout the period in which the plaintiffs attempted to secure the pay-
ment by private negotiation, financial difficulties plagued the corporation, and the value of the stock
was "nominal." Id. at 439.
74. Id. at 438.
75. Id. at 439.
76. Id. at 444. The court agreed that the plaintiffs had failed to adduce evidence "of any inten-
tion on their part to be bound by any contract to sell their stock to [the defendant]." Id. at 443,
77. Id. at 441 (quoting U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1977)).
78. Id. It is noteworthy that the Zamore court quoted the Uniform Commercial Code incor-
rectly: "Although the record is silent thereon, it is apparent that the [p]reference stock in this close
family corporate business is not of a type 'commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets,'
nor is it commonly recognized in any area securities exchanges or markets as a medium for invest-
ment." Id. (emphasis added). The statute correctly reads: "A 'security' is an instrument which ...
is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized in any
area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment ...." U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(ii) (1977)
(emphasis added). The misquotation may have been the source of the court's misguided holding; an
instrument may be viewed as a medium for investment in the area where it is issued without being
the object of trading on an exchange. Note, supra note 45, at 589. The Zamore court relied on
Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Assocs., 37 A.D.2d 166, 171, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43 (N.Y. App, Div. 1971),
in which a New York appellate tribunal held that the term "security" as defined in Article 8 does not
include co-operative apartment stock. The Maine court went on to ask itself whether the shares
might be considered "goods," so that Article 2 of the U.C.C. would apply to their transfer, but then
abandoned the question. Zamore, 395 A.2d at 441-43.
79. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
80. Cf. Note, supra note 45, at 590 ("The common thread running through cases holding that
closely held stock is not a security is a focus on the requirement that this stock be 'of a type com-
monly dealt in upon securities exchanges and markets or commonly recognized in this area as a
medium for investment.' ") (footnote omitted) (quoting U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(ii) (1977)).
81. See Rhode Island Hosp. v. Collins, 117 R.I. 535, 538, 368 A.2d 1225, 1227 (1977). In
Collins the court noted that
[a] common thread running through all investment securities is the reasonable expec-
tation that dividends will be derived from the profits which in turn are the results of the
managerial or entrepreneurial efforts of others. While some stocks may properly be classi-
COMMERCIAL LAW
While public corporations are operated by strangers for the benefit of sharehold-
ers and provide return in the form of dividends, close companies often depend
for profits on the business or professional skills of the investors themselves. 82
For example, in Gulf Mortgage & Realty Investments v. Alten 8 3 the plaintiff, a
judgment creditor, 84 discovered that his debtor owned seventy-five percent of
the stock of a professional corporation and sought to reach the stock under the
authority of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court held that the Code's
definition of a security was inapposite on the ground that professional corpora-
tion shares are "not commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets." 85
The majority of jurisdictions brings close stock within Article 8's definition
of a "security."'86 Most courts stress that all types of corporate stock constitute
instruments "commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets," or are
at least "dealt in as a medium for investment." In Wamser v. Bamberger,87 for
example, the plaintiff submitted a written offer to purchase the stock of Masco
Corporation to the defendant, the sole shareholder.8 8 The defendant orally ac-
cepted the offer, assuring the plaintiff that there was no need to close the deal for
four days.8 9 Later the same day, the defendant informed the plaintiff that he
had accepted a competing offer and therefore was cancelling the deal. 90 The
plaintiff brought suit, seeking either specific performance of the agreement or the
damages he had sustained by the defendant's breach.9 1 The defendant re-
sponded by arguing that the statute of frauds rendered any contract, if one ever
had existed, void and unenforceable.9 2 On appeal from the trial court's grant of
summary judgment for the defendant, 93 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals re-
jected the plaintiff's argument that a factual dispute existed over the issue of
whether Masco stock constituted a "security" for purposes of the Code.94
Although plaintiff urged that Masco was a small, family-owned company whose
fled as investment securities, we have no doubt that Collins' stock does not fall within the
definition.
Id.
82. Note, supra note 45, at 590; cf. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328
N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975) (close corporations often feature substantial shareholder participation in the
management and operation of the business); F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 62, § 1.02, at
34 (shareholders often perform the daily management duties of closely held companies).
83. 282 Pa. Super. 230, 422 A.2d 1090 (1980).
84. The Uniform Commercial Code permits creditors to reach securities owned by their debt-
ors. U.C.C. § 8-317(2) (1977).
85. Gulf Mortgage, 282 Pa. Super. at 234, 422 A.2d at 1092.
86. See cases cited supra note 58.
87. 101 Wis. 2d 637, 305 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1981). The Wamser decision is noteworthy
because, unlike in most "security" definition cases, the stock in question did not contain transfer
restrictions. Id. at 646, 305 N.W.2d at 162.




92. Id. Reasoning that the Masco stock constituted a "security" under § 8-102(l)(a)(ii) of the
Uniform Commercial Code, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that the Code's statute of frauds (embodied in U.C.C. § 8-319) barred the plaintiff
from enforcing the agreement. Id. at 639-40, 305 N.W.2d at 159.
93. Id. at 639, 305 N.W.2d at 159.
94. Id. at 645, 305 N.W.2d at 161.
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stock was difficult to se1 9 5-the very factual argument that had carried the day
in decisions embracing the minority position96-the court viewed the question
not as an issue of fact, but as a matter of law to be decided by examining the
underlying policies of the Uniform Commercial Code.9 7 After quoting the Offi-
cial Comment to Article 8's definition of a "security," 98 the court observed that
the drafters' expansive language plainly shows that the Code calls for employing
a broad definition of "security." 99 Holding that the "undisputed evidence
clearly brings the Masco stock within the definition of a security,"' ' o the court
concluded that the Code's statute of frauds was applicable to the case and af-
firmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.101
The issue of the proper Code definition of the term "security" also arises in
the context of shareholders' agreements that attempt to restrict the transferabil-
ity of close corporation stock.' 0 2 A New York case, Pantel v. Becker,10 3 illus-
trates one such agreement-an oral promise between shareholders to confer first
refusal rights on one another should anyone decide to sell his interest. The
plaintiff, the owner of forty percent of the stock of a close corporation, 10 4 sued
to enforce the oral contract.' 0 5 The defendants responded by asserting the Uni-
form Commercial Code statute of frauds, arguing that the agreement was not
enforceable because no writing proved its existence.10 6 The court agreed. t0 7
95. Id. at 645, 305 N.W.2d at 162. The court framed the issue thus: "In essence, [the plaintiff]
argues that the stock was not of the type sold in exchanges or markets and not a 'medium for
investment."' Id.
96. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
97. Wamser, 101 Wis. 2d at 645-46, 305 N.W.2d at 162.
98. Wisconsin had adopted the 1977 version of Article 8. For a discussion of the history of the
Uniform Commercial Code, see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. Although section 8-
102(1)(a)(ii) is identical in the 1977 and 1962 versions of the Code, the drafters revised the Official
Comment to the 1977 version, clarifying their original intention to include the stock of closely held
corporations in the definition. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-102 amended official comment (Supp.
1990).
99. Wamser, 101 Wis. 2d at 646, 305 N.W.2d at 162 ("[Niumerous other cases have held that
corporate stock which was 'restricted,' Le., even less salable than the stock here, was a 'security'
under the Uniform Commercial Code provision involved in this case. These holdings support our
conclusion.") (citing E.H. Hinds, Inc. v. Coolidge Bank & Trust Co., 6 Mass. App. 5, 372 N.E.2d
259 (1978); Pantel v. Becker, 89 Misc. 2d 239, 391 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Previti v.
Rubenstein, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 882 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 647, 305 N.W.2d at 162.
102. Besides the practical difficulty of finding a buyer for less than controlling blocks of closely
held companies, shares in these corporations are frequently subjected to the legal limitations ofshare
transfer restrictions. H. HEr & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATO NS § 281, at 756 (1983).
Share transfer restrictions attempt to ensure that the corporation retains its "closely held" status and
strive to achieve, within the limited-liability shelter of the corporate form, the partnership hallmark
of'delectuspersonae-a partner's right to choose new members of the firm. See BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 383 (5th ed. 1979). The restrictions may aim also to preserve a close corporation's existing
management structure or to maintain secrecy in the conduct of corporate affairs. Id.; see also T.
HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 20.5, at 458 (2d ed. 1990) (share-
holder restrictions attempt to preserve current management in power).
103. 89 Misc. 2d 239, 391 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
104. Id. at 240, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
105. Id. at 240, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 325-26. The contract provided first refusal rights to the extent
that a continuing stockholder might purchase from the seller so many shares as would bring his
interest to 50% of the total number of outstanding shares. Id.
106. Id. at 241, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
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Although it acknowledged that securities exchanges and markets seldom deal in
the stock of close corporations,108 the court nevertheless held that close stock is
"certainly commonly recognized by many people as a medium for invest-
ment." 10 9 Similarly, in Jennison v. Jennison 1 10 a Pennsylvania court held that
close corporation stock constitutes a "security" under Article 8 of the Code even
when burdened with share transfer restrictions. 111
Bankruptcy courts also have answered affirmatively the question whether
close stock constitutes a "security" for purposes of the Uniform Commercial
Code. In one notable case, In re Sandefer,'1 2 the debtor was the sole share-
holder of a closely held corporation that followed him into bankruptcy. 113 After
the corporation's assets were sold and its creditors paid, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy transferred the surplus from the sale to the debtor's bankruptcy estate.114
A creditor, seeking to satisfy a portion of its judgment lien against the share-
holder-debtor from the surplus, argued that the lien had attached to the debtor's
stock in the corporation.1 15 The United States Bankruptcy Court for the North-
ern District of Alabama, noting that the Uniform Commercial Code was the
only statute purporting to govern the circumstances under which shares of stock
107. Id. Pantel was not the first New York decision to examine § 8-102(1)(a)(ii). In Previti v.
Rubenstein, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 882 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant had breached their oral agreement to sell each other the 50% interests they each owned in
two separate close corporations. Id. at 883. The defendant pleaded the U.C.C. § 8-319 statute of
frauds, and the plaintiff responded that the statute did not apply to close corporation shares. Id.
The court disagreed, observing that the definition of "security" was intended to include all shares of
stock, not merely those traded by security brokers and their customers. Id. at 883-84. Previti, appar-
ently the earliest case to construe the Code's definition of "security," expresses succinctly the con-
struction of the statute adopted by a majority of courts. See cases cited supra note 58.
108. Pantel, 89 Misc. 2d at 241, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
109. Id. To hold otherwise, the court noted, would work a "strained construction of the stat-
ute." Id. It is interesting to note the court's reliance on the phrase "medium for investment"; by
viewing closely held stock simply as one type of investment medium, fewer courts might have re-
sorted to the strained analysis found in cases like Zamore and Blasingame.
110. 346 Pa. Super. 47, 499 A.2d 302 (1985). Jennison involved facts identical to those of Blasin-
game, discussed supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text. The defendant lured the plaintiff into the
management of his company with 50 shares of stock and the promise that the plaintiff would be able
to acquire a controlling interest in the future. Jennison, 346 Pa. Super. at 49-50, 499 A.2d at 303.
When the time came to transfer the final installment of shares, the defendant indicated that he
wanted to retain voting rights for a substantial period of time. Id. at 50, 499 A.2d at 303. The
plaintiff brought suit, but the defendant successfully pleaded the statute of frauds. Id. at 50-53, 499
A.2d at 303-305.
111. The court stated:
Shares of stock in a closely held corporation are, after all, shares of stock, which are
clearly instruments "of a type" commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or markets.
They also fall within the commonly recognized meaning of an "investment".... The fact
that a corporation may be closely held or the shares bear a transfer restriction may affect
the ease and frequency with which the stock is traded or the desirability of the stock as an
investment but it does not make it something other than a "security."
Id. at 53, 499 A.2d at 304.
112. 47 Bankr. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985) (mem.).
113. Id. at 135.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 136. Historically, in the absence of statute, shares of stock in closely held corpora-
tions have been viewed as intangibles, incapable of caption and delivery, and therefore immune to
levy and sale under execution. Id.
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can be levied by execution,1 16 reasoned that it had to decide whether close cor-
poration shares are "securities" before it could apply the Code.117 On the
ground that close stock, like publicly traded stock, represents an interest in a
corporate enterprise, the court decided that closely held shares are "of a type"
publicly traded and, therefore, constitute a "security" under the Code. 118 Be-
cause the stock was neither "certificated" nor "seized" by the sheriff, however,
as the statute required, the court held that the creditor's judgment lien did not
attach to the close corporation stock. 119
Similarly, the outcome of In re Domestic Fuel Corporation 120 rested on the
definition of close corporation stock within the meaning of Article 8. A creditor
sold its debtor all the stock in two wholly owned corporations. 121 Pursuant to
an agreement, the parties placed the stock in escrow for ten years while the
debtor made payments toward the balance.1 22 When the debtor filed a petition
for reorganization in bankruptcy court, the creditor sought relief from the auto-
matic stay of bankruptcy on the theory that, as a secured creditor, his interest in
the escrowed stock was inadequately protected. 123 The debtor argued that be-
cause closely held shares are not a "security" under the Article 8 definition, the
creditor's interest was unsecured and therefore not entitled to protection. 124 Af-
ter a thorough analysis of all the elements of section 8-102,125 the bankruptcy
court concluded that certificates of stock in closely held corporations are instru-
ments "of a type" that may be publicly traded or "dealt in as a medium for
investment." 126
116. Section 8-317 governs the levy and sale of stock under execution. U.C.C. § 8-317 (1977).
117. Sandefer, 47 Bankr. at 137.
118. Id. at 138. The court reasoned that the stock of closely held corporations differs from that
of publicly traded companies in two fundamental ways. First, investors in publicly traded stocks
expect to obtain profits in the form of dividends "generated by the corporation through the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." Id. (citing Rhode Island Hosp. v. Collins, 117 R.I.
535, 538, 368 A.2d 1225, 1227 (1977)). Second, the trading of closely held companies differs greatly
from that involving publicly traded enterprises both in the number of shares and stockholders and in
the general size of the business. Nevertheless, the court observed, a share of stock always represents
an ownership interest in an enterprise, an instrument "of a type" traded upon securities exchanges or
markets. Id.
119. Id. at 140.
120. 70 Bankr. 455 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
121. Id. at 456.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 459. The creditor argued that a security interest had been perfected when the bank
placed the stock certificates in escrow. Id. at 460.
124. Id. at 459-60.
125. Id. at 461-62.
126. Id. at 462 (citing In re Sandefer, 47 Bankr. 133, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985); Katz v.
Abrams, 549 F. Supp. 668, 671 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (mem.); Baker v. Gotz, 387 F. Supp. 1381, 1389-90
(D. Del.), aff'd merr, 523 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1975); Gross v. Vogel, 81 A.D.2d 576, 576-77, 437
N.Y.S.2d 431, 432-33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (mem.); and Pantel v. Becker, 89 Misc. 2d 239, 241-42,
391 N.Y.S.2d 325, 326 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977)). The court distinguished between stock certificates,
which constitute certificated security interests in a corporation's assets, and shares of stock, which it
viewed as uncertificated security interests. Id.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine also has challenged the minority
view that close corporation shares are not "securities" for purposes of Article 8. In In re
Kontaratos, 10 Bankr. 956 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981), the court recognized that the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine, in Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435, 441 (Me. 1978) (discussed supra notes 70-80
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The complex and often unique needs of close corporation participants pres-
ent difficulties for the drafter of commercial statutes. As human circumstances
change, informal agreements and unspoken expectations among close corpora-
tion participants may lead to disappointment and feelings of betrayal. The
North Carolina position-applying the term "security" to close corporation
stock-is a sensible answer to an uncomplicated but difficult problem. Holders
of close stock now must insist on a writing to ensure performance of an agreed-
upon transaction. Close corporation participants can blame the law and secure
their rights without risking the loss of trust and good feeling that could accom-
pany a unilateral demand for a writing to prove the existence of an agreement.
The movement among state courts toward considering close corporation
stock a "security" under the Uniform Commercial Code parallels United States
Supreme Court companion decisions holding close stock to be a "security" for
purposes of the federal securities laws. 127 In Landreth Timber Co. v. Lan-
dreth 128 the Court confronted the question whether selling all of the stock in a
and accompanying text), had removed close stock from the Code definition of a "security." The
bankruptcy judge, however, urged that
[c]ompelling policy considerations militate against extension of the Zamore rule. Sim-
plicity, clarity and uniformity in the law governing commercial transactions are not
prompted by a rule dictating different collateral classifications on the basis of the presence
or absence of a family relationship among stockholders. The Uniform Commercial Code
implies no such distinctions. It classifies certain types of instruments as "investment securi-
ties," without regard to the identity of the holders, and without reference to the size or
function of the enterprise.
Id. at 960-61 (footnotes omitted).
127. The Supreme Court repeatedly has ruled that the definitions of "security" in § 3(a)(10) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 are essentially identical
and will be treated as such in decisions seeking to define the scope of the term. Landreth Timber Co.
v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985) (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3
(1982); United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975)). See generally
O'Brien & Moye, The Sale of Business Doctrine: Landreth Adds New Life to the Anti-Fraud Provi-
sions of the Securities Acts, 11 VT. L. REv. 1 (1986) (concluding that the sale of business doctrine
contradicted legislative policy and history of federal securities acts).
128. 471 U.S. 681 (1985). In Landreth the defendants, a father and his sons, owned all the
outstanding stock of a family lumber mill business. They offered their stock for sale through local
and out-of-state brokers, and secured a purchaser who bought the business. Id. at 683-84. When the
mill failed to satisfy expectations, the purchaser filed suit against the sellers, claiming that the de-
fendants had widely offered and sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities
Act of 1933, and that the defendants had materially misrepresented the worth and prospects of the
company in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 684. The district court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the "sale of business" doctrine
removed the transaction from the purview of the federal securities acts, and the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed. Id. at 684-85.
Citing its opinion in United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the United
States Supreme Court reversed, recognizing that the stock in question had all the characteristics
usually associated with common stock, i.e., "(i) the right to receive dividends contingent upon an
apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or hypothecated; (iv) the
conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to
appreciate in value." Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686 (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 851). The Court also
observed that the sale of stock in a corporation is "typical of the kind of context to which the [federal
securities] acts normally apply," so that an investor in this context would likely believe herself pro-
tected by the federal securities laws. Id. at 687. Thus, interpreting close corporation stock to fall
within the federal securities acts' definition of "security" comports with the purpose of the acts
themselves---"compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of'the many types of instru-
ments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security."' Id. (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)); cf. id. at 697-700 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating
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close corporation constitutes the sale of a "security," 129 which implicates the
antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933130 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.131 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, reasoned that when the
instrument is traditional stock, there is no need "to look beyond the characteris-
tics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply."' 132 The same rea-
soning prevailed in Stanil, despite the decision's different statutory context. As
Justice Mitchell observed, "'[s]hares of stock in a closely held corporation are,
after all, shares of stock, which are clearly instruments "of a type" commonly
dealt in on securities exchanges or markets.' "133 The United States Supreme
Court rejected directly the same argument that the North Carolina Supreme
Court spurned indirectly-that proper construction of the definition of a "secur-
ity" always requires analysis of the "economic substance" of the transaction in-
volved. 134 Under the Supreme Court's reasoning, when the instrument involved
in a transaction is "traditional stock," a "plain meaning" approach to the statu-
tory language is required.135
In Gould v. Ruefenacht 136 the Supreme Court held that the sale of fifty
percent of the stock in a closely held company is the sale of a "security."'137 As
in Landreth, the companion decision to Gould, the Court refused to look beyond
the word "stock" to decide whether close corporation shares are "securities"
subject to regulation under federal laws. Justice Powell refused to permit a trial
court's factual determination of whether a given transaction effected a "sale of
business"-the passing of corporate control to a stock purchaser-to govern the
application of the 1933 and 1934 securities acts.138
A comparison of the Landreth, Gould, and Standil opinions reveals the sim-
that Congress did not intend the antifraud provisions of the federal securities Acts to apply to the
private sale of a substantial ownership interest in a business simply because the sale was structured as
a sale of stock rather than a sale of assets).
129. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 683.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988).
131. Id. § 78.
132. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 690.
133. Stancil, 326 N.C. at 769, 392 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting Jennison v. Jennison, 346 Pa. Super.
47, 53, 499 A.2d 302, 304 (1985)).
134. Compare Landreth, 471 U.S. at 689-91 (economic reality test was designed to determine
whether a particular instrument is an "investment contract," and does not preclude simple applica-
tion of statutory language) with Stancil, 326 N.C. at 768, 392 S.E.2d at 375 ("[I]t is inconsequential
whether the shares of stock in question are in fact suitable for trading or have ever been traded on an
exchange or market.").
135. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 693.
136. 471 U.S. 701 (1985). In Gould the respondent purchased 50% of the stock of a close corpo-
ration whose president previously had been the sole shareholder. Id. at 702. In making the purchase
the respondent relied upon the financial representations of the president, the company's accountant,
and corporate counsel. Id. at 702-03. When he became convinced that some of the representations
were inaccurate, the respondent sued, alleging violations of the securities acts. Id. at 703. For the
reasons announced in Landreth, see supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court
held that "where an instrument bears the label 'stock' and possesses all of the characteristics typi-
cally associated with stock ... a court will not be required to look beyond the character of the
instrument to the economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the stock is a 'secur-
ity.'" Id. at 704 (citing United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975)).
137. Id. at 704.
138. Id. at 704-05 (citing Hazen, Taking Stock of Stock and the Sale of Closely Held Corpora-
tions: When Is Stock Not A Security?, 61 N.C.L. REv. 393, 406 (1983)).
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ilar reasoning employed by courts construing the term "security" in different
statutory contexts. The comparison raises in turn the question whether state
courts should look to federal decisions interpreting the definition of "security"
as persuasive authority for their own deliberations, and vice versa. Although
entirely different statutes produced the Landreth, Gould, and Stancil litigation,
the underlying issue in each case was the protection of investors. The federal
securities acts directly embrace this goal,139 and Article 8 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code indirectly advances a similar aim: the assurance that parties can
accomplish transfers of investment securities, and agreements to transfer them,
with certainty and order.14° Article 8 therefore effectively ensures that close
corporation participants who reduce their share transfer agreements to a suffi-
cient writing are "protected" from anxiety that the transaction may not occur
because they are unable to prove its existence. Although federal case law may
not always provide an answer to state securities law questions, the attorney in
search of an argument to lay before a state appellate court might profit from
consulting federal decisions on the definition of a "security."
The North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in StanciI is a major develop-
ment in commercial law for attorneys whose clients include close corporations.
The decision firmly establishes the rule that an agreement to sell close stock will
not be enforceable unless the parties satisfy the requirements of the Uniform
Commercial Code's statute of frauds for the sale of investment securities. 141
The statute requires a writing, signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought, sufficient to indicate that a contract exists for the sale 42 of a stated
quantity of securities at a defined or stated price. 143 Absent such a writing, the
"reasonable expectations" 144 of parties to contracts for the sale of close stock
will avail them nothing. Informality in the operation and management of close
corporations may be judicially acceptable, but the solemnity and certainty of a
writing are necessary for contracts to sell close stock to be enforceable.
139. Cf. Gould, 471 U.S. at 706 (purpose of federal securities acts is to protect investors); Lan-
dreth, 471 U.S. at 696-97 (prospect that "parties to a transaction may never know whether they are
covered by the Acts until they engage in extended discovery and litigation" is daunting).
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8 N.C. comment (1986) ("Article 8's basic object is to give invest-
ment securities full and complete negotiability .... ").
141. See id. § 25-8-319 (Supp. 1990), quoted in full supra note 20. Although the supreme court
framed the "central question" in Stancil as whether to include close corporation stock within Article
8's definition of a "security," Stancil, 326 N.C. at 768, 392 S.E.2d at 375, the effect of the decision is
to require all agreements to sell close stock to be provable by a sufficient writing. Id. at 770-71, 392
S.E.2d at 376.
142. It is important to note that the contract must be for the sale of securities. "Purchase" and
"sale" are not the same under the Code. As the definition of "purchase" in § 1-201(32) shows,
giving a gift or taking a security interest would constitute a "purchase" under the Code. U.C.C. § 1-
201(32) (1977). Thus, "[a]lthough all sales are purchases, the reverse is not true." W. HAWKLAND,
R. ALDERMAN & NV. SCHNEIDER, supra note 40, § 8:319:02, at 384. Section 8-319 of the U.C.C.
applies to sales only. Id.
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-319(a) (Supp. 1990).
144. The "reasonable expectations" test, familiar to North Carolina corporate lawyers from the
supreme court's decision in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 299, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (1983),
has no application to questions of commercial law. See Stancil, 326 N.C. at 767-68, 392 S.E.2d at
375 (reliance on Meiselman inapposite to the question whether close corporation stock is a "secur-
ity" for purposes of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
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The North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in Standil is more than an
intelligent response to the realities of close corporation stock ownership. A clear
majority of state and federal courts now favors the view that closely held stock
constitutes a "security" for purposes of Article 8.145 Indeed, the amended com-
ments to the 1977 version of Article 8's definition of a "security" reveal that the
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended close stock to fall within the
definition of a "security." 146 Judicial attempts to make close corporation stock
an exception create an anomaly: close stock may ripen into an Article 8 security
if the number of shareholders grows, even though the nature of the interest re-
mains the same.
Commentators often suggest that close corporations are the most common
form of incorporated enterprise.1 47 Closely held companies provide many
North Carolinians with far more than "media for investment"; successful close
corporations frequently constitute the backbone of family financial health. Thus
the supreme court's decision in Stancil is a positive development. The require-
ment that purchasing and selling shareholders satisfy the statute of frauds will
promote certainty in transfers of close corporation stock. Attorney vigilance is a
small price to pay for financial security.
MARTIN H. BRINKLEY
145. See cases cited supra note 58.
146. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-102 amended official comment (Supp. 1990) ("Interests such
as the stock of closely-held corporations, although they are not actually traded upon securities ex-
changes, are intended to be included within the definitions of both certificated and uncertificated
securities by the inclusion of interests 'of a type' commonly traded in those markets.").
147. One writer suggests that approximately 95% of all incorporated businesses have 10 or fewer
shareholders. See Conard, The Corporate Census: A Preliminary Exploration, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
440, 458-59 (1975).
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